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Abstract 
A long-standing ideology in business education has been that a corporation is run for the sole interest of 
its shareholders. I present an alternative view where increasing concentration of economic activity and 
power in the world’s largest corporations, the Global 1000, has opened the way for managers to consider 
the interests of a broader set of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Having documented that this 
alternative  view  better  fits  actual  corporate  conduct,  I  discuss  opportunities  for  future  research. 
Specifically,  I  call  for  research  on  the  materiality  of  environmental  and  social  issues  for  the  future 
financial  performance  of  corporations,  the  design  of  incentive  and  control  systems  to  guide  strategy 
execution, corporate reporting, and the role of investors in this new paradigm.  
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1.  Introduction 
Corporations are now engaging in environmental and social causes with multiple stakeholders in 
mind.
1 I attribute this phenomenon to the increasing concentration of economic activity in the world’s 
largest corporations, which has led to a larger social and environmental impact from the activities of few 
corporations that can be more easily located and held accountable by an increasingly activist civil society. 
The  depersonalization  of  property  and  the  objectification  of  the  corporation,  associated  with  the 
separation of ownership and control, have further contributed to the shifting role of the corporation in 
society. I describe future opportunities for research arising from an alternative view of the corporation in 
society, where the world’s largest corporations attach greater importance to the interests of stakeholders.
2 
During the last twenty years, an increasing number of companies have  voluntarily integrated social 
and environmental policies in their business model and operations. Similarly a large number of companies 
have started to externally report their environmental and social performance, in addition to their financial 
performance. This increased emphasis on the relationship between business and society  can be justified 
based on economic groun ds. This  is  the well-known  ‘doing  well  by  doing  good’  theory  (Margolis, 
Elfenbein and Walsh, 2003), whereby improving environmental and social performance will eventually 
lead to higher levels of financial performance. This claim is based on the belief that meeting the needs of 
other stakeholders, such as employees through investment in training and customers through superior 
product  quality  and  safety,  directly  creates  value  for  shareholders  (Freeman  et  al.,  2010,  Porter  and 
Kramer, 2011). It is also based on the belief that not meeting the needs of other stakeholders can destroy 
shareholder value through, for example, consumer boycotts (Sen, Gurhan-Canli and Morwitz 2001), the 
inability  to  hire  the  most  talented  people  (Greening  and  Turban  2000),  and  punitive  fines  by  the 
government (Hillman and Keim, 2001).    
On the other hand, scholars have argued that engaging in environmental and social initiatives can 
destroy shareholder wealth (Friedman 1970; Navarro 1988; Galaskiewicz 1997). In its simplest form the 
argument states that these initiatives are just another type of agency cost, where managers receive private 
benefits from embedding environmental and social policies in the company, but doing so has negative 
financial  implications  (Baloti  and  Hanks  1999;  Brown,  Helland,  and  Smith  2006).  More  broadly, 
according to this argument management might lose focus by diverting attention to issues that are not core 
to the company’s strategy and business model. Moreover, these companies might experience a higher cost 
structure  by,  for  example,  paying  their  employees  above-market  wages,  engaging  in  environmental 
mitigation efforts beyond that required by regulation, failing to reduce their payroll rapidly enough in 
                                                           
1 For example, Southwest Airlines has identified employees as their primary stakeholder; Novo Nordisk has identified patients 
(i.e., their end customers) as their primary stakeholder; Natura has committed to preserving biodiversity and offering products 
that have minimal environmental impact. 
2 Stout (2012) argues that the normative argument that the fiduciary duty of managers and directors is to maximize shareholder 
wealth is not consistent with US corporate law. 3 
 
times of economic austerity, passing on valuable investment opportunities that are not consistent with 
their values, earning lower margins on their products due to more expensive sourcing decisions to appease 
an NGO, and losing customers to competitors by charging a higher price for features that customers are 
potentially  not  willing  to  pay  for,  such  as  responsibly  and  environmentally-friendly  sourced  raw 
materials. Companies that do not operate under these constraints will, it is argued, be more competitive 
and, as a result, thrive better in the competitive environment. The hypothesis that companies trying to 
address environmental and social issues will underperform is well captured in Jensen (2001): ‘Companies 
that try to do so either will be eliminated by competitors who choose not to be so civic minded, or will 
survive only by consuming their economic rents in this manner.’ (p. 16). 
However, as I will argue below, a positive link between environmental and social responsibility and 
financial performance is not a necessary condition for firms to manage and disclose their environmental 
and social activities. Nor is it the case that a focus on the environment and society is necessarily a 
manifestation of an agency problem. To characterize a managerial action as an agency problem, one 
needs to identify accurately the principal and her/his objectives. I will argue that as economic activity 
became concentrated in just a handful of corporations, their role in society was shaped to serve broader 
interests and not just shareholders. As a result society, not just shareholders, also became the principal. 
Berle and Means (1932) predicted this many decades ago. In their own words ‘The control groups have, 
rather, cleared the way for the claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the control [groups]. 
They have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the 
owners or the control but all society.’ (p. 312).  
The shifting role of the corporation in society is consistent with companies engaging not only with 
environmental and social issues that are important for their future financial performance, but also with 
issues that are immaterial for their future financial performance (Eccles and Serafeim, 2013). Companies 
not only spend resources to improve their environmental and social performance on immaterial issues, but 
they also report on those efforts.  A study by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) 
found that 50 percent of disclosures related to environmental and social issues are immaterial for the 
future long-term financial performance of a company.
3 However, the shifting role of the corporation in 
society would predict this phenomenon; the Global 1000 will engage in societal issues that are important 
to a wide range of stakeholders , independent of whether by doing so they will contribute positively to 
their future profitability. In other words, the Global 1000 strives to improve and report its performance on 
environmental and social issues that are material to stakeholders, but not the company. The separation of 
ownership and control means that owners are indifferent about what companies do as long as their 
capacity to generate returns is not fundamentally impaired. The responsiveness of companies to multiple 
                                                           
3 Ongoing study by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). 4 
 
stakeholders is aligned with their interests—while it does not promise huge returns, it does protect against 
precipitous declines.   
It is important to highlight that throughout this paper I adopt a positive rather than a normative 
approach. In other words, I do not discuss whether the increasing concentration of economic activity in 
the  world’s  largest  corporations  and  the  increasingly  active  management  of  material  and  immaterial 
environmental and social issues is a good or a bad thing. These questions are outside the scope of my 
paper. However, I discuss findings from the research that examines the relationship between financial and 
environmental or social performance. 
The  increasing  commitment  of  corporations  to solve  environmental  and  social  problems  raises  a 
number of fundamental questions for business scholars. First, identifying the most material environmental 
and social issues for any given company is an area where significant managerial and civil society energy 
is being devoted, but research is lacking. Second, research on how companies can design their incentive 
and control systems to drive these environmental and social efforts inside an organization could generate 
useful insights. Third, we know little about how the disclosure of environmental and social information 
has changed managerial behavior. A long-standing assumption behind civil society actors, like the Global 
Reporting  Initiative  (GRI)  and  the  Carbon  Disclosure  Project  (CDP),  is  that  reporting  can  drive 
performance. Fourth, the corporate reporting landscape is being revolutionized by the introduction of 
integrated reporting. However, we lack any systematic evidence about the benefits and costs of integrated 
reporting.  Nor  do  we  have  a  clear  understanding  about  how  integrated  reporting  instills  ‘integrated 
thinking’ inside a firm. Finally, research on how the disclosure of environmental and social data changes 
resource  allocation  decisions  by  investors  could  shed  light  on  how  users  of  the  information  force 
companies to internalize some of their externalities. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the increasing concentration of 
economic  activity  in  the  Global  1000  and  how  the  corporate  objective  shifts  as  a  function  of  the 
concentration. Section 3 provides evidence that companies are increasingly engaged in environmental and 
social issues and that size is an important determinant of this engagement. Finally, section 4 provides a 
framework with opportunities for future research and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Global 1000 
The large multinational corporations of the 21
st century are a relatively new phenomenon. Studying the 
historical context of the last four centuries clearly illustrates the rise of the large corporation in society 
and the conditions that allowed for this to happen.  
The largest and most influential organizations up through the seventeenth century were the church 
and the state in Europe. Both the church and the state, two organizations that were often effectively 5 
 
merged, threatened by the rise of large corporations, managed to limit corporate power by establishing 
legal barriers, which restricted corporate growth. This started to change in the 18
th century, when project-
specific corporate charters were given to corporations, especially in the U.S. where a weaker federal 
government allowed state governments to issue corporate charters. However, the ability of organizations 
to grow was limited due to their project-specific existence, the finite duration of corporate charters, and 
the difficulty of concentrating large amounts of capital in the then existing legal forms of partnerships and 
joint-stock companies in the absence of a developed financial system. 
This  changed  in  the  U.S.  when  states,  beginning  with  Connecticut  in  1837,  made  incorporation 
generally available by mere registration; no longer was a special charter from a state legislature needed, 
and all special charter needs disappeared by 1870 (Perrow 2002). This was preceded by the Supreme 
Court’s infamous 1819 ‘Dartmouth decision’. With that decision corporations, like people, were given 
private  rights  and  state  control  over  corporations  was  made  very  limited.  In  the  same  year,  another 
decision that allowed corporations to grow was the ruling to make owners of corporations not subject to 
imprisonment for debts, even if as individuals they could be sent to jail for much smaller amounts of debt. 
The  concept  of  ‘limited  liability’  was  born.  That  same  year,  a  third  decision  came  to  further  allow 
corporations to gain power, over employees this time. A ruling declared that the federal government acted 
for the people directly, and its laws would prevail over the laws of any state in regards to corporate 
conduct (Sellers 1991). As the federal government barely existed at that point, the economy was left 
essentially unregulated (Perrow 2002). 
    Interestingly, as Sellers (1991) documents, this legal revolution was not accidental. At the turn of the 
18
th century, the lawmakers that instituted these legal changes came from a tiny cohort of elite college 
graduates. Judges, who did not use to be lawyers before then, now almost exclusively came from this elite 
group. The law profession grew and became inundated with members of entrepreneurial families who 
could afford to send their son to law school. Judges assumed more power over legal matters by gradually 
determining  that  juries  could  only  rule  on  matters  of  fact,  not  law,  and  they  could  not  violate  the 
instructions of the judge. Some landmark subsequent decisions tilted the balance of power towards the 
owners  of  corporations  and  away  from  employees  and  communities.  In  1824,  courts  announced  the 
doctrine of ‘contributory negligence’; the failure to put a guard rail was inconsequential because the 
employee was negligent in being too close to the machinery when cleaning it. In 1842, it was ruled that if 
the killed or injured employee was not negligent then it was the fault of his fellow worker but not of the 
employer;  the  ‘fellow  servant’  rule.  In  1839,  externalization  of  costs  from  corporate  activity  was 
legitimized; a judge in Kentucky ruled that trains could run through Louisville, despite the noise and 
pollution caused, because so necessary were the ‘agents of transportation in a populous and prospering 
country that private injury and personal damage … must be expected’ (cited in Sellers 1991, page: 52). 6 
 
These legal precedents set the stage for the increasing concentration of economic activity in a few 
large  corporations,  which  was  documented  in  the  early  20
th  century  (Berle  and  Means  1932).  This 
concentration continued throughout the 20
th century, assisted by the wave of globalization. As of the end 
of 2012, just 1,000 corporations (Global 1000) were responsible for half of the total market value of the 
world’s more than 60,000 publicly traded companies. Consider how quickly this situation has emerged. In 
1980 the world’s largest 1,000 publically listed companies made $2.64 trillion in revenue, or $7.0 trillion 
in 2012 dollars, adjusted using the consumer price index. They directly employed nearly 21 million 
people, and had a total market capitalization of close to $900 billion ($2.4 trillion in 2012 dollars), or 33 
percent  of  the  world  total.  By  2012,  the  Global  1000  made  $34  trillion  in  revenue.  They  directly 
employed 73 million people, hundreds of millions in their supply chains, and had a total market cap of 
$28 trillion. These companies and their supply chains have an enormous potential to confer both good and 
ill on society. They create goods and services for customers, wealth for their shareholders, and jobs for 
millions  of  people.  They  also  consume  vast  amounts  of  natural  resources,  pollute  local  and  global 
environment at little or no cost, in the case of large financial institutions they throw economies into 
recessions due to poor risk management, and, in some cases, hurt employees’ well-being if wages and 
working conditions are inadequate. 
  This great concentration of economic activity makes clear that the Global 1000 affects billions of 
people around the world. For example, Philips, the Dutch diversified industrial giant, estimated that it 
‘improved’ the life of 1.7 billion people in 2012 through its products.
4 Dow estimates that it is consuming, 
on a daily basis, as much energy as Australia  (Eccles et al. 2012). Between 1995 and 2010 efforts to 
improve Dow’s environmental performance resulted in energy savings that could power all residential 
buildings of California for 20 months (Eccles et al. 2012). Royal Dutch Shell and Wal-Mart booked sales 
of $454 billion and $447 billion respectively in 2011. Out of 206 countries recognized by the United 
Nations, only 26 had nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) higher than these sales numbers. Deutsche 
Bank held $2.8 trillion in assets in 2011. Gazprom spent more than $48 billion in capital expenditures in 
2011 and Toyota more than $10 billion in research and development. For comparison, only 16 countries 
spent more than $10 billion in research and development. 
  The Global 1000 are now able to exercise incredible power over employees, suppliers, customers, and 
even regulators. Consider for example the extraordinary concentration of food supply in just a handful of 
multinationals.  Nestle,  Kellogg’s,  General  Mills,  Pepsico,  Kraft,  Unilever,  and  Procter  &  Gamble 
comprise a group of consumer goods giants that control the dietary lifestyles of consumers and have been 
                                                           
4 See Philips 2012 Annual Report at 
http://www.philips.com/shared/assets/Investor_relations/pdf/Annual_Report_English_2012.pdf. 7 
 
accused of consciously contributing to the increasing problem of obesity.
5 Or consider that at the end of 
the first decade of the 21
st century, DuPont and Monsanto together dominated the world seed markets for 
maize  (65%),  and  soya (44%).
6  Monsanto controlled  more than 90  percent of the global genetically 
modified (GM) seed market.
7 Three companies, ADM, Cargill, and Zen Noh, handled over 80 percent of 
U.S. corn exports.
8 Similarly, through a series of mergers and acquisition in the 1980s, and continuing 
through today,  the U.S. media industry is now dominated by six large conglomerates: Comcast, Walt 
Disney, News Corp, Time Warner, Viacom,  and CBS.
9 These companies are estimated to control 70 
percent of cable broadcasting. Time Warner alone is estimated to transmit news to 178 million unique 
users every month.
10  
  Corporate power is a function of size for several reasons.
11 First, larger companies are able to affect 
the political process through lobbying. A long literature documents the effect of lobbying   by large 
corporations on political outcomes (Hillman et al., 2004). Second, larger companies are able to shape 
consumer preferences through spending large amounts of money on advertising. Third, larger companies 
are able to exercise more power over employees and establish new labor practices, especially in areas 
with high unemployment and as a result few outside options for employees.   Foxconn, the Chinese 
manufacturer which has been repeatedly criticized for its labor practices, is still a preferred employer 
among Chinese workers (Eccles et al., 2011).  More generally, large corporations have been shown  to 
shape culture and society by establishing hierarchies and as a result imposing a power structure in society 
(Perrow, 2002). The hypothesis that size is  associated with power is consistent with larger companies 
having higher profitability margins, such as Return -on-Equity, experiencing slower mean reversion in 
profitability (Healy et al., 2013), and increasing more their profitability margins by the development of 
the financial system (Lundholm et al., 2013). 
  However, the people that the Global 1000 reaches, through its operations and products, have a diverse 
set of interests in their roles as employees, consumers, investors,  and community members. Consumers 
want high quality products at  reasonably low prices. Employees want job  security coupled with fair  
                                                           
5 See Michael Moss, February 20
th 2013, The Extraordinary Science of Addictive Junk Food, The New York Times, 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/magazine/the-extraordinary-science-of-junk-food.html?pagewanted=all&_r=3&  
6 ETC Group, 2003, ‘Oligopoly, Inc. – concentration in corporate power: 2003’, Communiqué, issue 82, November- 
December. 
7 ETC Group, 2002, ‘Ag biotech countdown: vital statistics and GM crops’, update, June. 
8 Memarsadeghi, S & Patel, R (2003) ‘Agricultural restructuring and concentration in the United States: who wins, who loses?’ 
Oakland: Food First. 
9 Alan B. Albarran and Bozena I. Mierzejewska. 2004. “Media Concentration in the U. S. and European Union: 
A Comparative Analysis.”  http://www.cem.ulaval.ca/pdf/albarran_mierzejewska.pdf 
10 Ashley Lutz, June 14, 2012. These 6 Corporations Control 90% Of The Media In America, Business Insider, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-america-2012-6 
11 Power is defined as the extent to which the behavior of one person or organization is influenced by the behavior of another 
(Roy, 1997). This definition of power includes both behavioral (e.g. the visible overt behavior of the power wielder in the form of 
a command, request or suggestion) and structural (e.g. ability to determine the context within which decisions are made by 
affecting the consequences across alternatives) power. 8 
 
compensation.  Investors  want  a  good  return  on  the  money  they  invested  in  the  company.  Local 
communities want an undisturbed environment and some compensation for giving the company a license 
to  operate  in  their  area.  The  larger  a  company  the  more  diverse  are  the  interests  of  the  different 
stakeholders. For example, a company that produces locally and sells in the same geographic region is 
likely to find its stakeholders have aligned interests since many of its customers will be part of the local 
community and also potentially employees. However, in the case of an oil and gas company that extracts 
oil in Equatorial Guinea and sells downstream in the US the interests of customers, employees, suppliers 
and local communities are likely to diverge significantly. It should come as no surprise then that as a 
company becomes larger and exercises more power over individuals with a greatly diverse set of interests, 
conflict  erupts  between  the  individuals  that  wield  the  power  and  those  subject  to  it.  As  there  is  a 
continuous desire for power, there is also a continuous desire to make that power the servant of the 
individuals affected (Berle and Means 1932). 
  As we will see in the next section, it is readily observable across the world that, in varying degrees of 
intensity, civil society is trying to subject corporate activities to a test of public benefit. And with just a 
few corporations comprising most of the economic activity, it has become easier to locate and hold them 
accountable for their effects on society. However, the ability to locate a corporate actor is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for civil society to increase pressure on corporations, especially given the largely 
trans-national nature of the  Global 1000 corporation. Civil society must also have the  resources and 
capability to exert this pressure.  By looking at the data, we can see that national and trans-national non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) representing civil society have grown in power and influence. NGOs 
in 26 countries account for 31 million employees, or almost 7 percent of the total workforce of those 
countries. Annually, NGOs in these 26 countries spend about $1.2 trillion, almost as much as the largest 
1,000  companies  of  the  world spend  in  capital expenditures.  In  emerging  economies,  such  as  India, 
Brazil, and the Philippines, where traditionally local NGO presence was weak, more than 200,000 NGOs 
were registered in 2007.
12 
  As a result of their expanded financial and human reso urces, NGO campaigns against specific 
corporations or against whole industries are becoming more sophisticated and more effective. These 
campaigns can have a significant effect on a company by damaging its brand and decreasing its social 
capital. Many of them have prompted regulatory actions that have affected the cost of doing business, 
while others have shifted customer attitudes, thereby affecting companies’ revenues. At the extreme, they 
have put the license to operate of companies or even entire industries at risk.
13 
                                                           
12 Nelson, Jane, “The operation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a world of corporate and other codes of conduct,” 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, working paper No. 34, 2007. 
13 For examples of high profile NGO campaign s against large corporations, such as Royal Dutch Shell, Pfizer, Unocal, and 
Novartis, see George Serafeim, and Robert Eccles, SMART Firms, 2014. 9 
 
  In addition to large financial and human resources that have increased campaign effectiveness, two 
other trends have allowed NGO campaigns to become more effective. One is information technologies, 
such as the internet and social media, which allow fast, low cost, and wide dissemination of information. 
The ability to quickly and cheaply disseminate information has enabled NGOs to inform people around 
the world about their campaigns and to mobilize large numbers of people to participate in protests and 
boycotts. The second is the ‘trust premium’ enjoyed by NGOs. In many public opinion surveys, NGOs 
are ranked as one of the most trusted institutions in society, with this trust premium increasing over time 
as trust in business and government have declined.
14 
  While the Global 1000 is increasingly under pressure to assume responsibility for its societal impact, 
accountability for corporate conduct is rarely asked by the shareholders of the Global 1000. Shareholders 
are hard to locate and be held accountable due to dispersed ownership structures and the surrendering of 
control of these corporations. As of 2011, the ten largest institutional investors in the world  collectively 
held 27.1 percent of the outstanding shares, on average, across Global 1000 companies. None of these 
investors holds more than five percent in any of the companies and few if any would qualify as active 
investors that engage and affect  the management of the operations of  the Global 1000; rather they are 
passive owners that tend to view equity holdings as temporary investments.  The rest of the shareholder 
base is widely dispersed with none of t he investors holding more than one  percent of the outstanding 
shares.  
The separation of ownership and control has allowe d shareholders to detach themselves from the 
responsibilities of a corporation to society.  For example, there are  hardly any cases I am aware of in 
which investors were heavily criticized and held accountable for the behavior of their investee. Rather the 
corporation itself and the senior management are held accountable for the actions of the corporation. In 
contrast, investors are able to trade their shares in liquid markets , and tend to do so quite often.  The 
average holding period has fallen between one and three years in the largest stock exchanges over the last 
two decades. For instance, in the 1980s, the average holding period in the New York stock exchange was 
over 5 years, compared to 5 months in the late 2000s (OECD, 2011).  
The combination of larger corporations that exert more power over society and the separation of 
ownership and control led to shareholders surrendering their right that the corporation should be operated 
for  their  sole  interest  (Berle  and  Means  1932).   In  the  words  of  Walter  Rathen au  (1918),  ‘The 
depersonalization of ownership, the objectification of enterprise, and the detachment of ownership from 
the  possessor  leads  to  a  point  where  the  enterprise  becomes  transformed  into  an  institution  which 
resembles the State in character.’ Berle and Means, while acknowledging that the stripping away of 
control from a shareholder’s property right is essential to the creating of a liquid and freely tradeable 
                                                           
14 See for example the surveys that underpin the trust barometer of the consulting firm Edelman. 10 
 
market for shares, went one step further, suggesting that giant corporations could only survive if they 
would  serve  the  community’s  interests.  “It  is  conceivable,--indeed  it  seems  almost  essential  if  the 
corporate system is to survive,--that the ‘control’ of the great corporations should develop into a purely 
neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to 
each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private  cupidity.” (pp. 312-
313). As they pointed out, the farmer is “married” to the horse, and needs the horse to thrive along with 
the farm and the surrounding community. A disinterested shareholder ownership of the farm does not 
obviate the pre-existing goals of the interdependent and thriving horse, farm, and community. 
While economic activity was beginning to concentrate in a small group of companies many decades 
ago,  as  Berle  and  Means  documented,  there  are  still  important  differences  that  have  led  the  large 
corporations of the early 21
st to assume more responsibilities compared to the large corporations of the 
20
th century. First, the large corporations of today are much larger than they were even twenty or thirty 
years ago; on an absolute basis, their scale is multiple times what it was in the past. Second, their reach is 
significantly more global than it was before. As a result, their impact transcends national boundaries and 
makes  the  world  more  interconnected.  Third,  there  is  incredibly  more  information  available  about 
corporate behavior, as compared to a few decades ago. Information technologies, in particular the internet 
and social media, have equipped civil society with very effective means to mobilize and counteract the 
power  of the  Global  1000.  Fourth,  civil  society  has  become  increasingly  sophisticated  in  collecting, 
analyzing,  and  interpreting  data  about  corporate  behavior.  To  match  the  increasing  concentration  of 
corporate power, NGO’s have also experienced increasing concentration in power, with one percent of 
NGOs generating about 85 percent of the revenues to the non-profit sector in the US.
15 Fifth, while in the 
early 20
th century there was a discussion of companies’ social responsibilities, no mention was made of 
resource scarcity and planetary effects such as climate change (Eccles and Krzus, 2010). The combination 
of  concerns  about  social  responsibility,  resource  scarcity,  and  planetary  effects  further  exacerbated 
pressure on large companies to serve the interests of society. 
The implication from the discussion in this section is that the largest companies would exhibit higher 
environmental and social performance in terms both of managerial commitments but also observable 
organizational  outcomes.  The  next  section  describes  the  increasing  corporate  involvement  in 
sustainability issues and tests the relationship between firm size and environmental/social performance. 
 
3.  Sustainability and The Corporation 
Environmental and social considerations are taking central stage in corporate agendas. The concepts of 
social responsibility, resource scarcity, and planetary effects culminate in the term ‘sustainability.’ While 
                                                           
15 See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ken-berger/nonprofit-effectiveness_b_2701812.html?utm_hp_ref=impact  11 
 
there are many definitions of sustainability, broadly speaking it represents a portfolio of environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) considerations upon which company performance can be evaluated. Figure 
I shows the universe of sustainability issues classified in five categories by SASB. These sustainability 
considerations are increasingly gaining acceptance in the corporate community. For example, in the 2010 
UN Global Compact – Accenture CEO study 81 percent of the respondents stated that sustainability 
issues are now fully embedded in the strategy and operations of their organization.
16 A joint study in 2012 
by the Boston Consulting Group and the MIT Sloan Management Review found that nearly 50 percent of 
the companies surveyed had changed their business model as a result of sustainability, a 20 percent jump 
over the previous year.  Reflecting the rapid adoption of sustainability practices , many companies have 
established a new C-level executive position for sustainability officers (e.g. AT&T, Blackstone, BT, Dow 
Chemical, Nestle, SAP, Siemens, Unilever, among many others).  
Furthermore, the exponential growth of sustainability reporting ,
17 as well as  integrated reporting, 
suggests the increasing acknowledgement that corporations should be accountable for the ir  societal 
impact. For example,  while only 26 firms issued a sustainability report in 1992, this number grew to 
5,162 by 2010 (Eccles et al., 2011).  As of 2012, more th an 6,000 corporations issued sustainability 
reports. The exponential growth in sustainability reporting is documented in Figure I I. The significant 
number of increase in reporting entities post 2000 can be partly attributed to the work of the GRI. GRI 
released an ‘exposure draft’ version of the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (SRG) in 1999, the first 
full  version  of  the  SRG  in  2000,  and  the  second  full  version  at  the  World  Summit  for  Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002, where the organization and the Guidelines were also referred to in 
the Plan of Implementation signed by all attending member states. 
The theory articulated in the previous section suggests that size would be a first-order determinant of 
sustainability commitments across organizations. I test this prediction using data from Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4. This data has been used in a number of previous studies (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Cheng, 
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). Table I uses as dependent variables the social and environmental scores 
assigned  to  each  company  by  Thomson  Reuters.  The  data  points  that  comprise  these  scores  are 
categorized as either “drivers” or “outcomes.” Drivers “track policies that cover issues such as emission 
reduction, human rights, and shareholder rights” whereas outcomes “track quantitative results such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, personnel turnover and highest remuneration package” (Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2012).  
                                                           
16 The word sustainability usually encompasses environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues that frame the relation 
between business and society. 
17 I describe as a sustainability report any report that includes environmental, social and/or governance firm-level data but not the 
financial results of a firm. 12 
 
Column (1) shows that 24.7 percent of the variation in the social score is explained by age of the firm 
(years), industry, and country fixed effects. Adding firm size as an explanatory variable to the regression 
increases the explanatory power by 19.5 percent to 44.2. Using environmental score as the dependent 
variable  yields  similar  results.  To  facilitate  comparison  of  the  importance  of  size  as  an  explanatory 
variable I also include variables that measure the risk-return profile of a firm. Specifically, I include 
Return-on-Equity (ROE), Market-to-Book (MTB), sales growth over the past three years, and stock return 
volatility as independent variables. Past research has argued that sustainability commitments are a form of 
luxury  good  and  as  a  result  can  be  afforded  only  by  well-performing  firms  (Hong  et  al.,  2011). 
Collectively, these variables add to the explanatory power of the model just 1.2 percent, raising it to 45.4 
percent. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) examine the determinants of corporate social performance, using 
the same dependent variables as in this paper, and find that the addition of more firm-specific variables 
(i.e., R&D expenditures, financial leverage, industrial diversification, analyst coverage, ADR trading) 
does  not  increase  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model  beyond  41  and  47  percent  for  social  and 
environmental scores, respectively. Excluding firm size from the model lowers the explanatory power to 
26.8 percent suggesting that the order with which the regressors enter the model does not change the 
results.  
One implication of this analysis is that the ‘corporate size’ theory dominates alternative theories such 
as the ‘luxury good’ theory (Hong et al. 2011). Firm size appears to be a very important determinant of 
firms’ social and environmental commitments.
18 In contrast, firm performance appears to  have been a 
relatively less important determinant. This is consistent with the idea that the world’s largest corporations 
are more subject and responsive to civil society’s demands. 
At this point, a conversation is warranted about whether sustainability has a positive, negative, or 
irrelevant effect on future financial performance. If it is the case that sustainability destroys financial 
value,  then  an  implication  from  the  previous  discussion  is  that  large  firms  are  at  a  competitive 
disadvantage compared to smaller competitors. A vicious cycle would ensue, in which large firms would 
be overtaken by smaller companies, with these smaller companies endangering their competitiveness as 
they become larger and engage in sustainability issues.  From a firm competitiveness perspective, being 
and remaining small would be a good thing. 
The evidence seems to support a positive relationship between sustainability and future financial 
performance  (Orlitzky,  Schmidt,  and  Rynes,  2003).  Very  little  evidence  exists  to  suggest  that 
sustainability can be an impediment to corporate profitability. In contrast, evidence is emerging that under 
certain conditions ‘sustainability pays.’ For example, Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) show that in 
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have shareholders with ‘deep pockets’ tend to have higher environmental and social scores. I find that this variable increases the 
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industries where firms extract large amounts of natural resources, compete on the basis of brand and 
reputation, and have customers the end consumer, firms that had integrated environmental and social 
policies outperform their competitors in the long-run. More generally, Serafeim (2014) shows that a 
firm’s value creation process is dependent on six capitals: natural, human, financial, physical, intellectual, 
and  social.  The  contribution  of  sustainability  to  future  financial  performance  depends  on  how 
sustainability affects the quality of these capitals. The neutral to positive relation between sustainability 
and financial performance suggests that large firms are not at a competitive disadvantage relative to small 
firms. 
 
4.  Opportunities for Future Research 
Because I have concentrated the discussion on the rise of the Global 1000 as an explanation for the 
increasing corporate commitment to sustainability, I am going to focus on opportunities for research that 
are relevant to the Global 1000. As a result, I will not discuss research areas that are very worthwhile but 
apply  to  smaller  organizations,  such  as  entrepreneurship,  social  entrepreneurship,  and  hybrid 
organizations.  Moreover,  I  will  take  as  given  that  corporations  are  managing  and  reporting  on 
sustainability  issues  and  as  a  result,  I  won’t  ask  the  question  of  whether  they  should  be  doing  so. 
Therefore, I adopt a positive rather than a normative approach. 
I start with questions about what companies actually do and how to define the materiality of the 
different sustainability issues for future company profitability. Having established what corporations do, I 
proceed to discuss how they can do it, specifically addressing issues of organizational design in terms of 
incentive and control systems. The next set of questions revolves around corporate reporting: how a firm 
communicates what it does and how it does it. Finally, I discuss the role of investors and how they can 
use the reported information. Figure III provides a visual description of these research topics. 
 
4.1. Which Sustainability Issues Does a Corporation Manage and Report On? 
A corporation affects society in a myriad of ways. As a result, the set of sustainability issues that a 
corporation faces can be overwhelming. These issues  often include concerns around climate change, 
product  safety,  corruption,  biodiversity,  human  rights,  and  political  lobbying,  just  to  name  a  few. 
Different stakeholders place more or less importance on different ESG issues and consequently lobby 
executives on different issues. This raises the real need for a company to narrow the set of sustainability 
issues and prioritize them based on their materiality.  
  Materiality can be thought as a measure of corporate impact on society for a specific sustainability 
issue. Under this line of thinking, climate change is a material issue for oil and gas firms. Human rights 
are a material issue for apparel manufacturers. Corruption is a material issue for extractive companies. 14 
 
Customer health and safety is a highly material issue for pharmaceutical companies. This is currently the 
thinking  behind  the  Global  Reporting  Initiative  (GRI),  and  guides  its  disclosure  framework.  From  a 
societal perspective, one would want transparency on any issue that the company is having a large impact, 
independent of whether that impact will affect a company in the long-term. This definition of materiality 
poses no requirement that there is a relation between sustainability and financial performance. 
Another layer can be added to the concept of materiality if it is defined as a measure of corporate 
impact on society for a specific sustainability issue that will eventually have an economic impact affecting 
the  long-term  financial  performance  of  the  company.  This  is  currently  the  approach  followed  by 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), which requires evidence of economic impact in order 
for a sustainability issue to be deemed material. This definition of materiality imposes a requirement that 
an  environmental  or  social  issue  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  a  firm’s  long-term  financial 
performance. An example that illustrates the difference between the two approaches is orphan drugs in the 
pharmaceutical industry. While rare diseases are obviously a societal issue that is of grave interest to 
patients, their families and many more people, there is little evidence to suggest that pharmaceutical 
companies that fail to invest and develop orphan drugs are impairing their long-term competitiveness. 
Due to the lack of clear guidance for what is material in the realm of sustainability, some companies 
have attempted to determine this for themselves through stakeholder engagement. This process may be 
used to build a ‘materiality matrix,’ with one dimension being ‘importance for the company’ and the other 
being ‘importance to society.’ For example, telecommunications giant Telefonica has identified ‘Privacy 
and  data  protection’  as  very  important  for  both  company  and  society  (Eccles,  Serafeim,  and  Cano-
Escoriaza, 2013). In contrast, ‘Responsible marketing’ is of higher importance for the company rather 
than society. ‘Environmental protection’ issues are more important for society rather than the company. 
‘Diversity’ scores low for both society and the company. Figure IV presents Telefonica’s materiality 
matrix for 2011. 
The  data  that  are  generated  from  these  materiality  matrices  can  be  used  to  answer  fundamental 
questions  about  which  societal  issues  corporations  are  grappling  with.  First,  how  reasonable  is  the 
assumption of SASB that sustainability standards should be industry-specific? Is there a strong consensus 
among firms in the same industry about the materiality of sustainability issues? Or do country and firm-
specific factors create significant disagreement? Second, how do firms respond to issues identified as 
important only for society but not for the company? Do they place less importance on these? Answering 
these questions would provide insights on which materiality definition companies subscribe to. 
 
4.2. How Do Executives Design Incentive and Control Systems? 15 
 
The design of incentive and control systems has a long history in management accounting. While we 
know a fair amount about how firms design these systems to achieve financial goals, there is almost no 
research  on  how  companies  design  systems  to  achieve  sustainability  goals.  There  are  some  key 
differences between financial and sustainability goals that might give rise to important differences in 
system design.  
First,  the  availability  and  quality  of  sustainability  metrics  is  significantly  lower  as  compared  to 
financial metrics, increasing the noise-to-signal ratio. For example, Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) 
documented that a relatively low percentage of companies measure sustainability information and an even 
lower  percentage  obtain  external assurance  on the adequacy  of the  processes that  generate  the  data. 
Moreover, performance on many sustainability issues is less controllable by the company, widening the 
gap  between  accountability  and  control.  For  example,  many  companies  engage  to  improve  the 
environmental and social performance of their supply chain partners, even though they have less control 
over  them  than  they  do  their  own  operations.  In  addition,  while  monetary  incentives  seem  to  work 
effectively at motivating behavior to achieve financial goals, it is not clear that this would apply to 
sustainability goals, where motivation might be driven by intrinsic and reputational factors (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2006; Eccles et al. 2013).
19 
A first path forward for research would be to examine how sustainability metrics are used in incentive 
and control systems. Does the higher noise-to-signal ratio, lower controllability, and potential crowding-
out of intrinsic and reputational motivation  lead to less intensive use of sustainability metrics in these 
systems? A second set of questions revolves around the combination of financial and sustainability 
measures. What is the optimal combination of financial and sustainability metrics that allows a firm to 
achieve its objectives? 
 
4.3. How Does a Corporation Report its Performance and Position? 
While significant requirements already exist for financial reporting, reporting on ESG performance is a 
relatively  new  phenomenon.  In  1995,  Royal  Dutch  Shell  came  under  fire  for  alleged  human  rights 
violations stemming from its operations in Nigeria. Campaigns against Shell caused some investors and 
the public to temporarily lose confidence in the company. As part of an effort to inform consumers and 
repair its reputation, Shell issued a corporate social responsibility report in 1998, becoming the first large 
corporation to do so.   
Corporate sustainability reports and annual financial reports have typically been issued separately 
since companies have not customarily linked the concepts of ESG performance to financial performance. 
                                                           
19 For an interesting read on how social norms rather than monetary incentives can be more effective a recommended article is: 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/06/21/21climatewire-finding-the-weapons-of-persuasion-to-save-ene-
8137.html?pagewanted=all.  16 
 
Reports containing environmental and social data vary widely in terms of structure and content due to the 
lack of regulatory guidelines on how to report this information. Early adopters of sustainability reporting 
predominately  released  a  single  issue  report,  usually  disclosing  environmental  or  workplace  safety 
information. This evolved into multi-issue reports when companies began disclosing information relative 
to  the  organization’s  “triple  bottom  line,”  which  holistically  represented  its  economic,  social,  and 
environmental performance. This disclosure practice was most commonly referred to as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting or sustainability reporting.     
Unlike a sustainability report that is issued separately from the annual financial report, an integrated 
report is a single document that presented and explained both financial and nonfinancial information in a 
holistic manner.  Integrated reporting was developed in response to the need generated by stakeholder 
groups and investors for enhanced reporting that connected strategy, key performance indicators (KPI), 
and financial performance. A frequent argument in favor of integrated reporting is that it is an effective 
way of instilling ‘integrated thinking’ inside the firm and communicating to all stakeholders that the 
company is taking a holistic view of their interests. 
Fundamental questions exist concerning these reporting developments. I separate these questions into 
three categories: determinants, reporting choices, and consequences. On determinants, what motivates a 
firm to disclose its ESG performance? Are the motives behind sustainability and integrated  reporting 
similar or different? Second, how do companies choose what to report on? Does the information disclosed 
meet the materiality threshold, however defined? Eccles et al. (2012) report that companies in industries 
that will be affected by climate change (e.g., insurance, airlines, automobiles) have failed to provide 
climate change disclosures. Moreover, within the set of companies that report on climate change there is 
substantial variation on what they disclose, ranging from boilerplate disclosures to quantitative KPIs. 
Third, what are the consequences of sustainability and integrated reporting? Does reporting incentivize 
managers to improve their ESG performance? Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) studied the enactment of 
mandatory sustainability reporting in a sample of 58 countries, and showed that companies forced to 
report do in fact improve their ESG performance. Their results provide evidence that reporting can drive 
performance. 
 
4.4. What is the Role of Investors? 
Another  important  development  has  been  taking  place  within  the  investment  community.  In  many 
countries the socially responsible investing (SRI) movement has been gaining significant momentum, and 
it increasingly constitutes a non-negligible part of the broader financial system. In its early years, SRI was 
largely grounded and justified in terms of religious beliefs (e.g. exclusion of firms that sell weapons, 
tobacco, or alcohol), and it was therefore indistinguishable from ethical investing in terms of the type of 17 
 
values-driven investment screening applied. Yet as SRI developed into its modern form, it shifted away 
from an emphasis on ethics and towards the incorporation of ESG factors into investment decisions, 
thereby becoming an investment strategy (what is now termed “ESG integration”) that explicitly seeks to 
outperform rather than simply adopt an ethical stance on behalf of its investors. Many SRI funds now use 
ESG data as an integral part of the investment strategy in order to improve the risk-return profile of the 
portfolios, ultimately uniting ESG and traditional (economic) firm valuation into a “Triple Bottom Line” 
(i.e. by  considering  all three  broad  dimensions  of corporate  performance:  environmental,  social, and 
economic). Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) note that by 2007, mutual funds that integrated ESG data in 
their capital allocation decisions had assets under management of more than $2.5 and $2 trillion dollars in 
the United States and Europe, respectively. Similarly, SRI funds in Canada, Japan, and Australia held 
$500, $100, and $64 billion, respectively. Assets under management of socially responsible investors 
grew considerably: funds in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada grew by $400, $600, and 
$400 billion respectively, between 2001 and 2007 (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2013).  
To formalize and further institutionalize the SRI movement, in 2003 the United Nations Environment 
Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI) formed an Asset Management Working Group and commissioned 
11 reports from nine mainstream research institutions to study the financial materiality of ESG issues to 
securities’  valuation.  A  key  finding  of  this  initiative  was  that  “agreement  [among  analysts]  that 
environmental,  social  and  corporate  governance  issues  affect long-term  shareholder  value…  [and] in 
some cases those effects may be profound”. Two years later, in April 2006, the UN Secretary General 
Kofi  Annan  launched  the  Principles  for  Responsible  Investing  (UNPRI),  which  mainstreamed  SRI, 
coined  a  new  term  for  risk  and  return–driven  investors  (“Responsible  Investors”),  and  refined  the 
definition as those investors who incorporate ESG factors into their investment process. By April 2012, 
the  UNPRI  Global  Network  included  more  than 1,000  signatories  with  assets  under  management  of 
approximately $35 trillion.
20  
The  increasing  momentum  of  the  SRI  movement  within  financial  markets  has  also  led  to  a 
proliferation of academic studies seeking to better understand the performance of SRI funds. Specifically, 
Sparkes & Cowton (2004) perform a comprehensive review of this literatu re and find that SRI “has 
become an investment philosophy adopted by a growing proportion of large investment institutions” and 
that “this shift in SRI from margin to mainstream and the position in which institutional investors find 
themselves is leading to a new form of SRI shareholder pressure” (p.45, emphasis added).  
During this time, mainstream investors also witnessed the emergence of sustainability indices. In 
1999, for example, the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices were established as a family of indices that 
                                                           
20 United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, Annual Report 2012 at http://www.unpri.org/viewer/?file=wp-
content/uploads/Annualreport20121.pdf.  18 
 
would evaluate the sustainability performance of the largest 2,500 companies listed on the Dow Jones 
Global Total Stock Market Index. Several other indices followed suit, with the most prominent being the 
FTSE4GOOD index, Ethibel, Domini 400 Social Index, Vanguard Calvert Social Index Fund, and the 
Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ). In parallel, major investment banks established units with an 
explicit mandate of incorporating sustainability issues into firm valuations (e.g. Goldman Sachs set up GS 
Sustain). These developments further reinforced the emerging belief that sustainability was linked to 
value  creation  and  that  financial  markets  could  no  longer  regard  these  policies  as  peripheral  to  a 
corporation’s strategy (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014).     
The 2000s also witnessed an increase in investor activism. The number of environmental and social 
issues that were the subject of shareholder resolutions in the U.S. increased significantly (Glac, 2010) and 
these resolutions were also increasingly more successful (Mathiasen et al., 2012). From 2008 through the 
first half of 2010, more than 200 institutional investors, collectively controlling a total of at least $1.5 
trillion in assets, filed or co-filed shareholder resolutions on ESG issues. Included in this group were 
resolutions asking firms for better disclosure and oversight of their political contributions and activities. 
Other recent social and environmental resolutions have addressed equal employment opportunity, climate 
change, human rights, and sustainability reporting. Moreover, the number of shareholder resolutions filed 
at U.S. companies on environmental and social issues has risen over the last decade from an annual 
average of 240 in 1999-2000 to more than 380 in 2007-2009 (Socially Responsible Investing Trends, 
2010). The average support that shareholder advocates are receiving for shareholder resolutions on social 
and environmental issues is also rising (Socially Responsible Investing Trends, 2010).
21 In fact, by 2012, 
ESG issues constituted the majority of all shareholder proposals (Ernst & Young, 2012).
22 
I categorize opportunities for research in two areas: integration and engagement. On ESG integration, 
there is a need for development of valuation meth odologies that incorporate ESG metrics.  Do  ESG 
metrics affect cost of capital, growth or return-on-capital estimates? How do different investors practice 
ESG integration and what are the implications for their investment performance?  On ESG engagement, 
how do investors choose to engage with a corporation on a specific sustainability issue? What determines 
the probability of success for these engagements? Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2013) documents that firms 
are more likely to be engaged, and engagements are m ore likely to be successful, if the target firm is 
concerned about its reputation and if it has a higher capacity to implement changes and improve its ESG 
performance. 
 
                                                           
21 Report available at http://socialresponsibleinvest.blogspot.co.uk/2010_11_01_archive.html  
22 Report available for download at http://www.ey.com/US/en/Newsroom/News-releases/Environmental-and-social-topics-lead-
shareholder-proposal-submissions-in-2012-proxy-season  19 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper presents an alternative view of the role of the corporation in society. Specifically, the largest 
corporations have a role to contribute positively to society by balancing different stakeholders’ interests, 
instead of maximizing profits. I attribute this change in the role of the corporation to the increasing 
concentration of economic activity and power in a few corporations which resulted in a) a few companies 
having a very large impact on society, b) corporations and influential actors which are easier to locate, 
and c) increasing separation of ownership and control. These events led to what Berle and Means (1932) 
predicted more than 80 years ago: both owners and ‘the control’ accepting public interest as the objective 
of the corporation. 
A few interesting observations arise from this alternative formulation of the role of the corporation in 
society. First, it is not static, as is the goal of profit maximization. Rather, the role of the corporation in 
society can be a function of the broader economic, social, and political context and as a result evolves 
over time. Second, corporations are not a homogeneous group as it is assumed by profit maximization; 
not all corporations have the same role in society. For example, in this paper the largest corporations have 
more of their activities put to the test of public interest. 
Managers  engage  in  a  range  of  activities.  Recently,  increasing  corporate  engagement  on 
environmental and social goals has redefined the relation between business and society. It remains to be 
seen whether this trend will continue. In the meantime, research on the topics outlined in this paper is 
likely to increase our understanding of corporate behavior and the role of these corporations in society.   20 
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Figure I 
Universe of Sustainability Issues 
 
Source: http://www.sasb.org/materiality/determining-materiality/  
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Figure II 
Number of Sustainability Reports by Year 
 
Source:  Robert  G.  Eccles,  George  Serafeim,  and  Phillip  Andrews,  “Mandatory  Environmental,  Social,  and  Governance 
Disclosure in the European Union." Harvard Business School Case 111-120, July 2011. 
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Figure III 
A Framework for Future Research 
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Figure IV 
Telefonica’s Materiality Matrix 
 
Source:  Robert  G.  Eccles,  George  Serafeim,  and  Asun  Cano-Escoriaza.  December  2012.  “Developing  the 
Materiality Matrix at Telefónica.” Harvard Business School Case 413-088. 
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Table I 
Size as a Determinant of Social and Environmental Performance Measures 
 
Social  score  measures  the  commitment  and  performance  of  a  corporation  in  relation  to  social  goals.  Environmental  score 
measures the commitment and performance of a corporation in relation to environmental goals. Firm size is the natural logarithm 
of sales. ROE is net income over beginning of year shareholder’s equity. MTB is stock price over book value of shareholder’s 
equity per share. Sales growth is the percentage change in sales over the last three years. Volatility is the annual standard 
deviation of weekly stock returns. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm-level. 
 
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Intercept 60.64 11.59 -33.99 -7.87 -32.68 -7.58 54.03 13.57 -37.60 -10.01 -37.25 -9.54
Firm size 11.34 39.73 11.36 40.53 10.98 37.27 11.02 37.73
ROE -1.67 -1.75 -0.32 -0.36
MTB 1.03 6.77 0.75 5.33
Sales growth -0.19 -11.99 -0.19 -11.84
Volatility -0.18 -4.74 -0.12 -3.10
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 24.7% 44.2% 45.4% 32.6% 49.6% 50.5%
N 20,281        20,281        20,281        20,281        20,281        20,281       
Environmental Score Social Score